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Abstract
Once regarded as mere pawns of their regimes, courts in authoritarian states
are now the subject of considerable attention within the ﬁeld of comparative
judicial politics. New research examines the ways in which law and courts
are deployed as instruments of governance, how they structure state-society
contention, and the circumstances in which courts are transformed into sites
of active resistance. This new body of research constitutes an emergent ﬁeld
of inquiry, while simultaneously contributing to a number of related research
agendas, including authoritarian durability and regime transition, human
rights, transitional justice, law and development, and rule-of-law promotion.
Moreover, this research offers important insights into the erosion of rights
and liberties in “consolidated democracies.”
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INTRODUCTION
Until recently, courts in authoritarian regimes were generally regarded as little more than window
dressing for dictators. The assumption was so widely accepted that research on judicial politics in
nondemocracies was rare prior to the 1990s.1 As a general rule, the same nuanced understanding
of courts as contested sites in democracies was largely missing from our approach to authoritarian
politics. But what began as a trickle in the 1990s turned into a ﬂood of new research over the
past decade. There has been a surge of interest in the topic and an increasing recognition of the
important and complex roles that law and courts play in authoritarian politics, both as institutions
of repression and, in many cases, as sites of active resistance. Research in the 1990s focused
primarily on case studies, often with the goal of understanding the forces at play in seemingly
anomalous, local contexts (Brown 1997, Loveman 1993, Lubman 1999, Mahmud 1993, Muller
1991, Newberg 1995, Osiel 1995, Pereira 1998, Rosberg 1995, Solomon 1996, Tate & Haynie
1993). Over time, however, scholars have becomemore aware of their position within an emerging
research agenda. Research on the topic is increasingly diverse in terms of method and scope, and
more ambitious in terms of theoretical reach.
To a large extent, this emergent body of literature addresses many of the core questions that
were posed in the late 1990s:
What motivates authoritarian rulers to grant nominal or even substantial independence to judicial
institutions?What strategies do judges adopt to expand theirmandate and increase their autonomy?Are
there discernible patterns of conﬂict, accommodation, and cooperation between judicial actors and state
leaders over time? How do courts in authoritarian systems structure political conﬂict and state-society
interaction? To what extent do courts in authoritarian systems provide avenues for political activists
to challenge the state, and what role do courts play in regime transition or sustained authoritarianism?
(Moustafa 1999; Moustafa 2003, p. 885)
Although the answers to these questions vary across particular cases, a variety of working theo-
ries have emerged to explain the dynamics of judicial politics in authoritarian regimes. The volume
of new research and frequent cross-referencing suggest that we have moved well beyond simplis-
tic caricatures of kangaroo courts and telephone justice—at least among the growing number of
scholars conducting work on judicial politics in authoritarian settings. This scholarship examines
the various ways in which regimes use law and courts as instruments of governance. And more
counterintuitively, this work ﬁnds that courts rarely serve as mere pawns of their regimes. In-
stead, courts more typically become lively arenas of contention, resulting in a “judicialization of
authoritarian politics” (Moustafa 2003, p. 926).2
This article provides a roadmap to the new literature on law and courts in authoritarian
regimes.3 I begin by reviewing work that seeks to understand why and how regimes use law and
courts as instruments of governance. Next, I survey research focused on the dynamics of legal
mobilization and legal contention in this most unlikely environment. I then turn to the various
strategies that authoritarian rulers employ to contain judicial activism and to constrain the
1Notable exceptions are Fraenkel (1941), Kirchheimer (1961), and Toharia (1975).
2A judicialization of politics is deﬁned elsewhere as “(1) the process by which courts and judges come to make or increasingly
to dominate the making of public policies that had previously been made (or, it is widely believed, ought to be made) by
other governmental agencies, especially legislatures and executives and (2) the process by which nonjudicial negotiating and
decision making forums come to be dominated by quasi-judicial (legalistic) rules and procedures” (Tate 1995, p. 28). This
review concentrates primarily on the ﬁrst mode of judicialization of politics.
3Given the volume of new scholarship, it is impossible to include every study in this review. Writing on the politics of law
and courts in China alone is worthy of a stand-alone review in the Annual Review of Law and Social Science.
282 Moustafa
A
nn
u.
 R
ev
. L
aw
. S
oc
. S
ci
. 2
01
4.
10
:2
81
-2
99
. D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.an
nu
al
re
vi
ew
s.o
rg
by
 S
im
on
 F
ra
se
r U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
n 
11
/1
0/
14
. F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
LS10CH16-Moustafa ARI 17 September 2014 14:11
emergence of synergistic support networks between courts and activists in civil society. Finally,
I suggest future lines of inquiry in this still nascent ﬁeld of research. As the work examined here
suggests, not only does the new literature on law and courts in authoritarian regimes constitute an
emergent subﬁeld of comparative judicial politics, but it also contributes to a variety of substantive
research agendas, including authoritarian durability and regime transition, transitional justice,
human rights, law and development, and rule-of-law promotion in fragile states. Equally im-
portant, this literature is increasingly relevant for the politics of many democratic states—perhaps
more so than many of us wish to acknowledge. More than a boutique niche, this research offers
important insights into the erosion of rights and liberties in “consolidated democracies.”
INSTITUTIONALIZING AUTHORITARIAN RULE THROUGH
LAW AND COURTS
Recent work examines the ways in which law and courts are deployed as instruments of governance
in authoritarian states. Although there is considerable variation across speciﬁc cases, a number of
common functions are noted. Law and courts are frequently deployed to (a) exercise state power
vis-a`-vis opposition, (b) advance administrative discipline within state institutions, (c) maintain
cohesion among various factions within the ruling coalition, (d ) facilitate market transitions,
(e) contain majoritarian institutions through authoritarian enclaves, ( f ) delegate controversial
reforms, and ( g) bolster regime legitimacy.
Rule by Law
The principal andmost apparent function of law and courts in authoritarian regimes is the efﬁcient
and disciplined exercise of state power. Jothie Rajah’s (2012) Authoritarian Rule of Law provides
a detailed example of the ways in which law and courts were deployed in the service of author-
itarianism by the government of Singapore. Through a detailed examination of the workings of
the Press Act, the Public Order Act, and other legislation, Rajah (2012, p. 46) demonstrates that
law “has been a key tool effecting the decimation of opposition parties[,]. . .the dismantling of
independent media[,]. . .and the thwarting of an autonomous civil society.” As such, Singapore
provides a textbook model for the ways in which law and legal institutions can be deployed to
sideline opposition and maintain political dominance without resorting to brute force. Perhaps
more important, Rajah shows us that many of the same institutions that we more typically asso-
ciate with liberal democracy—constitutions, elections, legislatures, law, and courts—can be used
as tools to subvert representative democracy and liberal rights.
Moustafa (2007b) similarly details the ways in which law served as the primary means by which
political opponents were sidelined in Mubarak’s Egypt. The exercise of political control through
law was most obvious in the state security courts, but law was also the principal tool to co-opt and
constrain opposition through the political parties’ law, the law on civil associations, laws governing
professional syndicates, and a web of regulations imposed on media. To be sure, the deployment
of extrajudicial force was the rare exception in Mubarak’s Egypt, not the rule. By advancing a thin
conception of rule of law—or, more accurately, “rule by law” (Ginsburg & Moustafa 2008)—the
regime dominated the opposition for decades while maintaining many of the trappings of a liberal
state, an important theme that I return to at the conclusion of this review.
Administrative Discipline
Many regimes also deploy law and courts to bolster discipline within the state administration. In
his seminal study, Courts, Martin Shapiro (1981) observes that judicial institutions are often used
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to generate an independent stream of information on bureaucratic misdeeds. He explains that “a
‘right’ of appeal is a mechanism that provides an independent ﬂow of information to the top on the
ﬁeld performance of administrative subordinates” (p. 50). Shapiro’s observation helps explain why
even authoritarian regimes with little regard for civil liberties often preserve the right of citizens
to have their day in court.
Peerenboom’s (2002) account of theChinese administrative courts provides a concrete example
of the ways in which judicial institutions are deployed to resolve principal–agent problems between
the center and periphery.Two of themost urgent problems facing theChinese central government
are widespread corruption by local ofﬁcials and tenuous control of the periphery. Both problems
are exacerbated by the sheer size and increasing complexity of the Chinese state. According to
Peerenboom (2002), efforts to address these problems began in 1988 with the establishment
of 1,400 specialized administrative courts across the country. The administrative courts were
designed toprovideChinese citizenswith an avenue throughwhich they could contest the decisions
of local ofﬁcials based on a variety of charges, including inconsistency, procedural irregularities,
arbitrariness, and inappropriate delay (p. 423). What is perhaps most surprising is the fact that
plaintiffs win 40% of the cases that they initiate, in whole or in part (p. 8). Although paradoxical
at ﬁrst blush, Peerenboom suggests that the administrative courts serve as a useful mechanism
to police and discipline state bureaucrats. Lubman (1999, pp. 258–69) and others point to a host
of problems that the administrative courts in China face, from a lack of sufﬁcient autonomy to
the ineffective implementation of court rulings. Yet despite these difﬁculties, law and courts are
viewed by the central regime as “a way to rein in increasingly independent local governments and
ensure that central Party and government policies are carried out” (Peerenboom 2002, p. 60).
A strikingly similar story emerges from studies of other authoritarian regimes. Rose-Ackerman
(2003) traces the origins of the Polish administrative court back to 1980, well before Poland’s
transition to democracy, as a means by which the regime could increase the accountability of the
bureaucracy to the central regime. Similarly, Verner (1984, p. 486) ﬁnds that during the six-decade
stretch of single-party rule in Mexico, citizens were encouraged to use the courts “for protection
against arbitrary applications by capricious individuals” who staffed various agencies of the state.
Verner underlines the fact that the government did not provide recourse to judicial institutions out
of pure benevolence. Rather, judicialmechanismswere used to better institutionalize its rule and to
strengthen discipline within its burgeoning administrative hierarchy. Similarly, Bourchier (1999)
ﬁnds that an administrative court system was established in Soeharto’s Indonesia after decades of
failed attempts to stamp out corruption in the government bureaucracy. Bourchier explains “the
most important factor behind the establishment of the Administrative Courts appears to have been
the desire of senior government ofﬁcials to improve the efﬁciency of the bureaucracy” (p. 248).
And in Egypt, Rosberg (1995) andMoustafa (2007b) trace how the administrative court systemwas
vastly expanded in the 1970s, again to restore discipline to a rapidly expanding and increasingly
unwieldy bureaucracy.
Elite-Level Cohesion
Judicial institutions are also sometimes used to maintain cohesion among regime elites. According
to Barros (2002), the 1980 Chilean constitution and the Tribunal Constitucional were designed
to arbitrate among the four branches of the military.4 Similarly, Skidmore (1988) and Stepan
4Ironically, the Tribunal Constitucional eventually turned against the regime and became an important institution paving the
way for the return to democracy.
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(1971) explain that the junta ruling Brazil from 1964 to 1985 had institutionalized a rotation of
power and codiﬁed concrete limits on presidential powers in order to prevent the regime from
slipping into a personalistic form of authoritarian rule. Albertus &Menaldo’s (2012) large-N study
suggests a more general pattern. Among the 71 cases surveyed between 1950 and 2002, they ﬁnd
that constitutions were frequently used to deﬁne and consolidate a distribution of power within
a ruling coalition. Moreover, they ﬁnd that the regimes using constitutions in this way tended to
retain power for longer periods of time.5
Judicial Institutions as Economic Infrastructure
The simultaneous opening of economies throughout the formerEasternBloc, LatinAmerica, Asia,
and Africa has meant ﬁerce international competition over a ﬁnite amount of investment capital,
and judicial reform has been identiﬁed as one of the most important institutional enhancements
necessary to facilitate a functional market economy and competitive investment environment. In
the age of global competition for capital, it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd any government that is not engaged
in some program of judicial reform designed to make legal institutions more effective, efﬁcient,
and predictable for the purpose of attracting global capital.
The tight link between judicial reform and the transition to a market economy is the focus
of considerable work on China in particular (Kennedy & Stiglitz 2013). Lubman (1999) and
Peerenboom (2002) provide two of the most comprehensive accounts of the rapid expansion of
legal and judicial infrastructure in post-Mao China. They detail the various ways that Chinese
leadership came to understand law and courts as integral to the success of the newmarket economy.
Law and courts came to be seen as “a weapon to be used in the ﬁght against corruption and ameans
of promoting economic development” (Peerenboom 2002, p. 60). Furthermore, courts are relied
upon to promote some measure of stability amid the displacement of millions of people in China’s
transition to a market economy (He 2014, Su & He 2010). Woo & Gallagher (2011) examine
the dynamics civil litigation in China, both in and around new legal institutions established by
the Chinese state. Sidel (2008) presents a similar account of market-oriented judicial reform in
Vietnam.
An important question raised in many of these studies is the degree to which judicial reform
necessarily leads to political spillover (Massoud 2014; Moustafa 2003, 2007b; Peerenboom 2010;
Rajah 2012; Silverstein 2008; Solomon 2010). Moustafa (2003, 2007b) shows that the Egyptian
Supreme Constitutional Court was granted a remarkably autonomous appointment process and
the power of judicial review as a way to assuage investor concern over the security of property
rights. Yet, within a decade of its establishment, the Court became an important engine for
political reform, often ruling against regime interests and incrementally expanding political
rights. Drawing lessons from Sudan, Massoud (2014) argues that international arbitration
provides avenues through which regimes can provide credible commitment to property rights
beyond the purview of the domestic judiciary, thus circumventing the possibility of political
spillover from empowered domestic courts. But it is perhaps the accounts of Singapore (Rajah
2012, Silverstein 2008) that best illustrate the fact that regimes can sometimes use law and courts
to promote both economic growth and political control. As Silverstein (2008) and Rajah (2012)
point out, Singapore has become something of a model for authoritarian regimes, especially
those in Asia, that seek to advance a market-led economy while maintaining a ﬁrm hold on
power.
5See Ginsburg & Simpser (2013) for more on the role of constitutional text, speciﬁcally.
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Courts as Authoritarian Enclaves
Courts are also deployed to contain majoritarian institutions, particularly in hybrid regimes.
Turkey provides perhaps the clearest example of how “institutions that might ordinarily be ex-
pected to secure democratic space, such as a strong and independent judiciary, may instead serve
as a constraint on political liberalization” (Bali 2012, p. 235). The Constitutional Court of Turkey
banned dozens of political parties and stymied political reform for decades. Belge (2006) traces
these rulings back to a foundational alliance and a set of institutional arrangements that served
to preserve the ideological and political hegemony of the Kamalist elite in Turkish political life.
These ﬁndings echo Hirschl’s (2000, p. 95) thesis that judicial review can provide “an efﬁcient in-
stitutional way for hegemonic sociopolitical forces to preserve their hegemony and to secure their
policy preferences.”More recently,Nardi (2010) understands the establishment of a constitutional
tribunal in Myanmar’s 2008 constitution as a mechanism that is likely intended to perpetuate the
military’s dominance in political life rather than constrain it.
In a twist on this theme,Trochev (2004, 2008) shows that subnational constitutional courtswere
established in postcommunist Russia as a means for regional governors to consolidate power and
establish autonomy vis-a`-vis local and federal governments. In his examination of 89 regions across
Russia, Trochev shows that subnational constitutional courts were not established in those regions
that had experienced a ﬂowering of democracy or a balance of power between contending political
factions, as cited in much of the literature on the emergence of judicial power (Chavez 2004,
Ginsburg 2003, Landes & Posner 1975). Instead, Trochev (2004, 2008) ﬁnds that subnational
constitutional courts were established only in those regions where power was concentrated. In
this instance, courts did not serve to expand democratic or liberal rights, but rather they served as
an additional tool for subnational governors to entrench their power.
Delegation of Controversial Reforms to Judicial Institutions
Authoritarian regimes also sometimes beneﬁt from channeling divisive political questions into the
courts. This phenomenon ismore familiar in democratic settings, where elected leaders sometimes
delegate decision-making authority to judicial institutions (Graber 1993, Lovell 2003). But it is
apparent that authoritarian regimes also prefer to steer clear of controversial issues that may
incite opposition or produce splits within the ruling coalition. This is particularly true in the
case of postpopulist authoritarian regimes that wish to implement unpopular economic reforms.
For example, Moustafa (2007b) shows how dozens of Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court
rulings enabled the Mubarak regime to overturn Nasser-era socialist-oriented policies without
having to face direct opposition from groups that opposed economic liberalization. Court rulings
gradually liberalized the economy while allowing the regime to claim that it was simply following
the judiciary and respecting the rule of law.
Law and Legitimacy in Authoritarian Regimes
The selective delegation of policy making to judicial institutions points to a broader concern
of authoritarian leaders: the maintenance of legitimacy in lieu of credible mechanisms of public
accountability. Authoritarian regimes typically pin their legitimacy to the achievement of substan-
tive outcomes, such as income redistribution, economic growth, political stability, and the like.
But to varying degrees, they also attempt to make up for questionable procedural legitimacy by
preserving judicial institutions that give the image, if not the full effect, of constraints on arbitrary
rule.
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In some cases, authoritarian rulers use courts as a ﬁg leaf for a naked grab at power. Del
Carmen (1973) notes that after seizing control of the Philippine government in 1972, Ferdinand
Marcos swiftly declaredmartial law, took over themedia, arrested political opponents, and banned
political parties, but he did not shut down the Supreme Court. On the contrary, in his ﬁrst public
statement,Marcos reassured the public that “the judiciary shall continue to function in accordance
with its present organization and personnel” (Del Carmen 1973, p. 1050). Marcos did not close
the Supreme Court, nor did he dismiss sitting justices. Instead, the regime adopted a number
of less direct measures to constrain the Court. The important point here is not whether there
were in fact effective checks and balances on the Marcos regime—there were not. Rather, the
point is that Marcos felt compelled to make such statements and to keep the Supreme Court
functioning to provide legal cover for his seizure of power. Similarly, Pereira (1998, pp. 54–55)
observes that in Brazil, “the regime pointed to the courts to claim legitimacy” whose legitimacy
in turn “was bolstered by a certain measure of autonomy.” Pereira (2005) notes that the Brazilian
case is not unique but rather illustrative of regimes throughout the Southern Cone of Latin
America.
In many cases, rule-of-law rhetoric is adopted as a legitimizing narrative only after popular
support has faded. Moustafa (2007b) notes that Nasser of Egypt pinned his legitimacy on revo-
lutionary principles of national independence, redistribution of wealth, economic development,
and Arab nationalism, whereas his successors explicitly pinned their legitimacy to sayadat al-qanun
(the rule of law). Peerenboom (2002) and Lubman (1999) note a similar transition to rule-of-law
rhetoric in China. Mao Zedong almost completely undermined judicial institutions after found-
ing the People’s Republic of China in 1949, but rule-of-law rhetoric is now employed by the
regime in part to ﬁll the ideological vacuum. In both Egypt and China, incoming leaders used
rule-of-law rhetoric to build a new legitimizing ideology and to distance themselves from the spec-
tacular excesses and failures of their predecessors. Granting access to the courts was a concrete
way to relieve political pressure without opening the political system. But for such legitimizing
functions to succeed, judicial institutions must enjoy some degree of real autonomy from the ex-
ecutive, and they must, at least on occasion, strike against the expressed will of the regime. As E.P.
Thomson (1975, p. 263) famously noted, “[T]he essential precondition for the effectiveness of
law, in its function as ideology, is that it shall display an independence from gross manipulation.”
Otherwise, legal institutions “will mask nothing, legitimize nothing.”
THE AMBIGUITY OF LAW AND COURTS IN
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES
Despite the fact that authoritarian regimes use law and courts as instruments of political control,
judicial institutions never advance the interests of rulers in an unambiguous and straightforward
fashion. Rather, courts more typically serve as dual-use institutions, paradoxically opening new
(albeit limited) avenues for activists to challenge the state.Not all regimes choose to institutionalize
their rule through law and courts. But to the extent that they do, they create a unique ﬁeld of
contention within the authoritarian state.
Diamant et al.’s (2005) edited collection Engaging the Law in China and Balme & Dowdle’s
(2009) edited collection Building Constitutionalism in China provide two rich sets of essays focused
on how courts have opened a space for entirely new modes of state-society interaction and con-
testation in China. Similarly, in the context of Egypt, El-Ghobashy (2008) and Moustafa (2002;
2003; 2007a,b) ﬁnd that courts enabled activists to challenge state policy without having to ini-
tiate a broad social movement—a difﬁcult task even in established democracies (Zemans 1983).
Tam (2013) identiﬁes similar advantages to legal mobilization in postcolonial Hong Kong, and
www.annualreviews.org • Law and Courts in Authoritarian Regimes 287
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Chua (2014) examines the unique constraints and opportunities faced by gay rights activists in
Singapore. Tezcu¨r (2009) examines the circumstances under which activists were able to exploit
limited openings in lower-level courts in Turkey. Groups that engage the courts might include
opposition parties, rights organizations, legal professional associations, and individuals who ﬁle
cases on their own initiative. For all these actors, courts afford unique opportunities to challenge
state policy through formal legal/political institutions. And yet, Chen & Xu (2012) observe that
courts may also stymie the emergence of more transformative rights claims by breaking collective
grievances into individuated disputes.
Moving beyond winning and losing, Moustafa (2007b) ﬁnds that courts can also provide im-
portant symbolic resources. He shows that activists initiated high-proﬁle cases challenging the
emergency law, state security courts, and civilian trials in military courts in Mubarak’s Egypt
with the full knowledge that they would never prevail. The purpose of the litigation was not to
win, but rather to expose the chasm between the regime’s rule-of-law rhetoric and the realities
on the ground and to generate fodder for the opposition press. As in democratic settings, litiga-
tion can serve to raise the salience of political issues, which can be an important objective in and
of itself.
Judges clearly occupy a strategic position in the interpretation, application, and (in some cases)
review of regime legislation. As agents of the state, judges generally administer the will of the
regime, but they never do so in an automatic fashion. Their identities and aspirations are shaped
by their training, which might emphasize thin (procedural) conceptions of the rule of law but, to
varying degrees, inevitably contain thick (substantive) conceptions of fundamental rights.Transna-
tional epistemic communities also shape how judges understand their role in advancing a thick
conception of the rule of law (Slaughter 2004, pp. 65–103).
Reform-minded judges may work to push the envelope through their judgments, capitalizing
on the important state functions that they perform to leverage pressure in the direction of political
reform. For instance,Moustafa (2003, 2007b) examines how the Egyptian SupremeConstitutional
Court leveraged the important role that it played in the regime’s economic reform program to
simultaneously push for a modest expansion of political rights. In other instances, courts have
managed to expand their mandate by exploiting divisions between state institutions. For example,
Ip (2012, p. 331) ﬁnds that the Supreme People’s Court of China was able to act “with considerable
autonomy to inﬂuence an ever-widening range of policy domains” by navigating ﬁssures within
the Chinese state.
Turning to local-level disputes in contemporary China, Stern (2010, 2013) provides a rich
contextual study of the opportunities and constraints that both lawyers and judges must navigate
on a daily basis. Rather than focusing on high-proﬁle and unambiguously political cases, she ex-
amines environmental litigation—an area that presents urgent policy dilemmas yet simultaneously
involves powerful public and private stakeholders. Stern examines the strategic dilemmas that this
presents for lawyers, activists, and judges who must navigate inconsistent and ambiguous signals
from local and central government.
Many studies note the important political roles that lawyers play outside of litigation, especially
through organized bar associations. In some cases, like that of Egypt, legal professional associations
have been important political actors for more than a century (Reid 1981, Ziadeh 1968). In others,
such as China, it is remarkable how quickly activist lawyers take up new roles, in the face of
tremendous personal risk, when the legal profession was virtually nonexistent only a generation
earlier (Halliday & Liu 2007).
What is perhaps most striking is the synergy that sometimes emerges from the “legal complex,”
which is deﬁned by Karpik & Halliday (2011) as networks of judges, lawyers, and other legally
trained professionals who, under certain circumstances, work together to advance fundamental
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rights.6 For example, Ghias (2010) examines the remarkable confrontation between legal profes-
sionals and the Musharraf regime in Pakistan, tracing how the courts shielded the bar association
from regime interference and, in return, how the bar association mobilized to protect the bench
from regime backlash.7 Similarly, Moustafa (2007a,b) documents the synergies that emerged be-
tween opposition parties, rights organizations, and activist judges inMubarak’s Egypt. Drawing on
recent literature and dozens of concrete examples, Trochev&Ellett (2014) provide an excellent re-
view of off-bench activism by judges in hybrid regimes. They examine the “repertoires of off-bench
resistance” (p. 71), exploring the various ways that judges work to enhance judicial autonomy.
Because of courts’ double-edged capacity, authoritarian rulers must constantly reassess the
costs and beneﬁts of law and courts as instruments of authoritarian rule. Ultimately, regimes can
reverse course, as happened in Egypt after a two-decade stretch of court activism (Moustafa 2007b)
and as may come to pass in China (Liebman 2014, Minzner 2011). But to the extent that regimes
depend on courts for the governance functions outlined above, reversing course entails its own
costs. Short of abandoning law and courts as instruments of governance, authoritarian regimes
more often work to contain them.
HOW REGIMES CONTAIN COURTS
Nowhere in the world do courts operate free of political constraints. Judges always face limits
on how far they can push legal claims, and this is particularly true in authoritarian contexts. But
authoritarian rulers oftenwork to contain judicial activismwithout infringing on judicial autonomy
through at least four principal strategies: (a) providing institutional incentives that promote judicial
self-restraint, (b) engineering fragmented judicial systems, (c) constraining access to justice, and
(d ) incapacitating judicial support networks.
Judicial Self-Restraint
Judges everywhere are ﬁnely attuned to the political environment that they operate within—they
anticipate the likely political fallout of their rulings, and they are generally aware of both the
reach and limits of their inﬂuence. The assumption that courts serve as handmaidens of rulers
obscures the political pressures that judges must navigate in authoritarian contexts, just as they do
in democratic contexts. Judges are acutely aware of their insecure position and their attenuated
weakness vis-a`-vis the executive, particularly when the cases before them impinge on core regime
interests.
Core interests vary from one regime to the next depending on substantive policy orientations,
but all regimes seek to safeguard the core legal mechanisms that undergird their ability to sideline
political opponents. Reform-minded judges can apply subtle pressure for political reform at the
margins of political life (Ellett 2013), but core regime interests are typically challenged only if it
appears that the regime is on its way out of power. In most cases, reform-oriented judges bide
their time in anticipation of the moment that the regime will weaken to the extent that defection
can tip the broader constellation of political forces (Helmke 2002, 2005).8
6For dozens of case studies of the legal complex in action (and sometimes taken out of action), see Halliday & Karpik (1997)
and Halliday et al. (2007, 2012).
7Also see Aziz (2012) and Munir (2012). For more on the Pakistani judiciary under dictatorship and democracy, see Newberg
(1995).
8Strategic defection in such a circumstance is also motivated by the desire of judicial actors to distance themselves from the
outgoing regime and put themselves in good stead with incoming rulers.
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These core-compliance dynamics are noted in dozens of authoritarian states. As an observer
of judicial politics in Argentina under authoritarian rule, Verner (1984, p. 487) concludes that
“although possessing the power of judicial review, the Supreme Court has used considerable
restraint in its exercise, and it has deﬁned as political any issue that might lead to a major conﬂict
with the executive branch – a conﬂict that all justices realize they would certainly lose.” In the
Egyptian case,Moustafa (2003, 2007b) notes that the SupremeConstitutional Court issued dozens
of progressive rulings to rein in executive abuses of power, but it never ruled on constitutional
challenges to the emergency laws or civilian transfers tomilitary courts, which formed the ultimate
check on political opposition. Similarly, Del Carmen (1973) notes that, in the early days of the
Marcos regime, the Philippine Supreme Court did not attempt to resist the decree of martial law.
Rather, the court yielded to Marcos’s seizure of power and continued to submit to the regime’s
core political interests for the next 14 years of rule. Mahmud (1994) uncovers similar dynamics in
Pakistan, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Nigeria, Cyprus, Seychelles, and Grenada. More recently,
Urribarri (2011) traces similar dynamics in Venezuela under Cha´vez. In these circumstances,
formal judicial independence exists within an authoritarian state.
The important dynamic to note is that authoritarian regimes were able to gain judicial com-
pliance and enjoy some measure of legal legitimation without having to launch a direct assault
on judicial autonomy. The anticipated threat of executive reprisal and the simple futility of court
rulings on themost sensitive political issues are typically sufﬁcient to produce judicial acquiescence
with the regime’s core interests. An odd irony results: The more deference that a court pays to
executive power, the more institutional autonomy an authoritarian regime is likely to extend.
The internal structure of appointments and promotions can also constrain judicial activism,
quite independent of regime interference. The judiciary in Pinochet’s Chile is a good example of
a court system that failed to act as a meaningful constraint on the executive, despite the fact that
it was institutionally independent from the government. According to Hilbink (2007), this failure
had everything to do with the process of internal promotion and recruitment, wherein Supreme
Court justices controlled the review and promotion of subordinates throughout the judiciary.
The courts did not fall victim to executive bullying.Rather, the traditional political elite controlling
the upper echelons of the judiciary disciplined judges who did not follow their commitment to a
thin conception of the rule of law.Hilbink’s Chilean example illustrates why judicial independence
is not, by itself, an unqualiﬁed good. A court system can enjoy complete formal independence from
the executive in terms of appointments, promotions, and discipline and yet face a corporatist form
of political control that is equally stiﬂing when practiced within the judiciary.
Fragmented Versus Unified Judicial Systems
Authoritarian regimes often contain judicial activism by further engineering fragmented judicial
systems wherein one or more exceptional courts run alongside the ordinary courts. The execu-
tive retains tight controls in these exceptional courts through nontenured political appointments
and heavily circumscribed due process rights. Politically sensitive cases are channeled into these
auxiliary institutions when necessary, enabling rulers to sideline political threats as needed. With
auxiliary courts waiting in the wings, authoritarian rulers can extend substantial degrees of auto-
nomy to the regular judiciary while risking little.9
9In an interesting twist on this dynamic, Hendley (2009) explains that Russia does not have a system of parallel security courts.
Instead, there are cases of telephone law that result in compliant judgments in sensitive political cases. Yet Hendley explains
that these cases are the rare exception, not the rule. In this way, telephone law and rule-of-law functions are carried out within
the same institution.
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Examples can be found in a number of diverse contexts. In Franco’s Spain, Toharia (1975,
p. 482) notes, “Spanish judges at present seem fairly independent of the Executive with respect
to their selection, training, promotion, assignment, and tenure.” Yet parallel tribunals acted “to
limit the sphere of action of the ordinary judiciary” (p. 487). This institutional conﬁguration
ultimately enabled the regime to manage the judiciary and contain judicial activism, all the while
claiming respect and deference to independent rule-of-law institutions. Toharia (1975, p. 495)
explains, “[W]ith such an elaborate, fragile balance of independence and containment of ordinary
tribunals, the political system had much to gain in terms of external image and internal legitimacy.
By preserving the independence of ordinary courts. . .it [was] able to claim to have an independent
system of justice and, as such, to be subject to the rule of law.”10 Likewise, Moustafa (2003,
2007b) notes that the state security and military courts in Egypt form a parallel legal system with
fewer procedural safeguards, serving as the ultimate check on challenges to regime power. In
fascist Italy, the Tribunale Speciale per la Sicurezza dello Stato performed the same functions. In
Portugal under Salazar, it was the Tribunais Plena´rios (Guarnieri & Magalhaes 1996). In Nazi
Germany, the regular judiciary continued to deal with everyday aspects of governance, including
business and family law, but it ceded authority to exceptional courts whenever required (Fraenkel
1941, Muller 1991). Loveman’s (1993) classic, The Constitution of Tyranny, examines the historical
origins and political functions of “regimes of exception” throughout Spanish America, noting that
formal rights provisions were possible only as the result of emergency clauses that allowed for the
easy suspension of rights.
The more that ordinary courts comply with core regime interests, the more they tend to enjoy
institutional autonomy and discretion. The more they challenge regime interests, however, the
more we tend to see an expanded purview for auxiliary courts or the use of extrajudicial violence.
Returning to the Egyptian example, Brown (1997) and Moustafa (2007b) note that the Supreme
Constitutional Court had ample opportunities to strike down provisions that denied citizens the
right of appeal to regular judicial institutions in Mubarak’s Egypt, but the Court almost certainly
exercised restraint because impeding the function of the exceptional courts would result in a futile
confrontation with the regime. Ironically, the Supreme Constitutional Court was able to push
through a mild reform agenda and maintain institutional autonomy largely because the executive
enjoyed the ability to transfer select cases to the exceptional courts and was therefore conﬁdent
that it retained full control of political opponents.
Pereira (2005) notes a similar dynamic between judicial and extrajudicial violence in his study of
courts in Argentina (1976–1983), Brazil (1964–1979), and Chile (1973–1989). The three regimes
varied in their willingness to use the regular judiciary to sideline political opponents.When courts
showed deference to the regime, political cases were routed through the regular judiciary, and re-
pression was therefore routinized and somewhat domesticated. When judicial–military relations
were poor, however, violence was extralegal in character, with much more lethal and arbitrary
consequences. Brazil and to a lesser extent Chile ﬁt the ﬁrst pattern; courts were used exten-
sively to sideline regime opponents. In Argentina, by contrast, courts retained a greater degree
of autonomy, but their scope of action was sharply reduced, and state violence took on an ex-
trajudicial dimension. Pereira (2005) underlines the fact that these distinctions are more than
academic—they had tremendous implications for the type of repression used and the fate of the
regime’s opponents. Following on this, Aguilar (2013) suggests that the degree of judicial complic-
ity in authoritarian repression may have signiﬁcant implications for the ability and willingness of
courts to facilitate transitional justice following regime transition.Her comparative study of Chile,
10Cheesman (2011) argues that in Burma special courts were introduced with the aim of undermining judicial independence.
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Argentina, and Spain thus opens a new research agenda that bridges studies of comparative judicial
politics in authoritarian regimes with core questions in the ﬁeld of transitional justice concerning
the different pathways taken following regime transition.
Constraining Access to Justice
Authoritarian rulers can also contain judicial activism by adopting a variety of institutional con-
ﬁgurations that contain access to justice. It has long been noted that civil law systems provide
judges with less maneuverability and therefore a weaker capacity to shape the law in comparison
to their common law counterparts (Merryman 1969, Osiel 1995).11 But regimes can engineer fur-
ther constraints though the institutional structure of judicial review (centralized versus diffused),
the type of judicial review (concrete versus abstract), and narrow legal-standing requirements
(Brown 2002). For example, Nasser abolished the diffused system of “abstention control” and
imposed a centralized structure of judicial review on the Egyptian courts (Brown 1997). A similar
centralization of review powers and narrow rules of standing were imposed in the 1982 Turkish
constitution, aligning the judiciary with regime interests and impeding the ability of activists to
challenge state policy through the regular courts (Belge 2006).12 Magaloni (2003) explains that
therewere limits on the types of legal challenges that could bemade against theMexican state under
the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which placed signiﬁcant constraints on the Mexican
Supreme Court. Similarly, Peerenboom (2002, p. 420) points out that the Chinese Administrative
Litigation Law empowers citizens to challenge decisions involving personal and property rights,
but not political rights, such as freedom of association, assembly, and speech. These select issue
areas speak volumes about the intent of the central government to rein in local bureaucrats while
sidelining overt political challenges through the courts.
Incapacitating Judicial Support Networks
Finally, authoritarian regimes can contain court activism by incapacitating judicial support net-
works. Epp (1998) demonstrates that the most critical variable determining the timing, strength,
and impact of rights revolutions in democratic settings is neither the ideology of judges, nor
speciﬁc rights provisions, nor a broader culture of rights consciousness. Rather, the critical in-
gredient is the ability of rights advocates to build sufﬁcient organizational capacity to engage in
deliberate, strategic, and repeated litigation campaigns. Rights advocates reap the beneﬁts that
come from being repeat players (Galanter 1974) only when they are properly organized, coordi-
nated, and funded. Although Epp’s (1998) study is concerned with courts in democratic polities,
his framework sheds light on the structural weakness of courts in authoritarian regimes.
Not only must activists overcome the collective action problems that bedevil political orga-
nizing in relatively liberal political systems; authoritarian regimes actively monitor, intimidate,
and suppress organizations that dare challenge the state. Harassment can come in the form of
extralegal coercion, but more often it comes in the form of a web of illiberal legislation spun out
from the regime. With the legal ground beneath them constantly shifting, rights organizations
ﬁnd it difﬁcult to build organizational capacity before having to disband and reorganize under
11Civil law judges are expected to apply the lawmechanically, resulting in a tendency toward thin rather than thick conceptions
of the rule of law. Shapiro (1981) contends that the differences between civil and common law systems are somewhat overstated.
12By contrast, the 1961 Turkish constitution provided that courts could practice judicial review if the Constitutional Court
had not issued a judgment within a deﬁned period.
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another umbrella association. Given the interdependent nature of judicial power and support net-
work capacity, the framework of laws regulating and constraining the activities of judicial support
networks is likely to be an important ﬂash point.
FUTURE LINES OF INQUIRY
The abundance of new literature on law and courts in authoritarian regimes suggests that we
have moved well beyond simplistic caricatures of kangaroo courts and telephone justice—at least
among the growing number of scholars focused on judicial politics in authoritarian settings. The
studies reviewed here all point to the fact that many authoritarian regimes use law and courts
as important instruments of governance. More important, this research shows that courts rarely
serve as mere pawns of regimes. Instead, they more typically become lively arenas of contention,
often resulting in a judicialization of authoritarian politics.
In considering future directions for research, I address both methodological and substantive
concerns.
Methodological Concerns
Most of the insights from this research agenda come from studies that are focused on law and
courts in speciﬁc authoritarian contexts. This is for good reason. Stern’s (2010, 2013) work on
environmental litigation in China reminds us that theorizing about law and courts in authoritarian
regimes is most accurate and compelling when it is informed by “close-to-the-ground” empiri-
cal data and the appropriate skill set to interpret those data. This requires language skills, rich
knowledge of the local political ecology, and extensive ﬁeldwork. “Constitutional ethnography”
(Scheppele 2004a) conducted in a variety of locales over the past two decades is beginning to
reveal both common dynamics and distinctive features across regimes, as is clear from frequent
cross-referencing in the literature.We are now at the moment whenmore general theory building
might proceed, but the temptation to overreach with universal theoretical claims is ever present.
Two approaches are particularly pernicious: (a) large-N studies that seek to test or generate new
theories without context-rich case studies and (b) theory building that is not grounded in any
empirical data whatsoever but rather proceeds through purely deductive reasoning and formal
modeling. Large-N studies are ill suited to the study of courts in authoritarian regimes because
no readily comparable data are available. And more to the point, even if data were generated
from the ground up, large-N studies would not adequately capture the way that courts interact
with other political institutions over time. Large-N comparison and purely deductive modes of
theory building risk overlooking the “politics of ambivalence” (Stern 2013), which is a deﬁning
feature of judicial politics (and politics at large) in authoritarian contexts. Of course, this does not
preclude small-N studies with careful cross-national case selection (e.g., Mahmud 1994, Pereira
2005) or studies that incorporate carefully designed, within-country comparison (e.g., Trochev
2004). Indeed, comparative studies that are sensitive to case-speciﬁc context have yielded some of
the most compelling research ﬁndings to date.
Substantive Concerns: Bridging the Authoritarian/Democratic Dichotomy
Aside from a deeper understanding of how law and courts operate in authoritarian contexts,
this literature further contributes to a wide variety of substantive research agendas, including
transitional justice (e.g., Aguilar 2013), human rights (e.g., Keith 2011, Pereira 2005), law and
development (e.g., Kennedy & Stiglitz 2013, Moustafa 2007b, Peerenboom 2002), authoritarian
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durability (e.g., Hilbink 2007, Moustafa 2007b, Rajah 2012), regime transition (e.g., Chavez 2004;
Helmke 2002, 2005), rule-of-law promotion in fragile states (e.g., Massoud 2013), and many
others. These works underline the central importance of law and courts to a wider community
of scholars working on the nonlegal dimensions of each of these substantive issue areas. Equally
important, this research has much to offer those concerned with the erosion of rights and liberties
in “consolidated democracies.” It is this issue that I wish to focus on for the remainder of this
article.
First, it may be worth considering the way that research on law and courts in authoritarian
contexts is situated in the judicial politics literature. It is understandable that many studies (includ-
ing this review) raise the banner of judicial politics in authoritarian regimes. The frame carries a
counterintuitive punch and simultaneously establishes the fact that there is a politics to courts in
nondemocracies, beyond facile caricatures of telephone justice. Yet this frame may have the un-
intended consequence of isolating the research as an anomalous niche. And walling the literature
off in this way tends to obscure the fact that it may have a great deal to contribute to the study of
politics in “democratic” settings.
The once hard-and-fast distinction between democratic and authoritarian polities is increas-
ingly blurred, as is clear from the proliferation of new adjectives and categories to describe hybrid
regimes (Bogaards 2009, Diamond 2002, Levitsky & Way 2010). A sharp dichotomy between
democratic versus authoritarian political systems is less helpful than ever for understanding the
way that power is organized, institutionalized, and contested in any given polity. Authoritarian
regimes increasingly rely upon institutional forms commonly associated with liberal democracy,
ﬁrst among them relatively independent judiciaries and multiparty elections (Brownlee 2007). But
so, too, have democracies increasingly borrowed from the playbook of authoritarian regimes.
Recent developments in Hungary provide a striking example. Reﬂecting on authoritarian drift
in Hungary, Scheppele (2013a,b) describes the emergence of a “Frankenstate” in the midst of
the European Union. The Hungarian Fidesz party came to power with only 53% of the popular
vote in 2010, but electoral laws translated this slim majority into 68% of seats in the unicameral
parliament—enough to amend the constitution. According to Scheppele’s (2013b, p. 561) gripping
account, this narrow opening was used to bring in a new constitutional order, including the
introduction of “more than 700 new laws, changing everything from the civil code and the criminal
code to laws on the judiciary, the constitutional court, national security, the media, elections, data
protection, and more.” Each of these changes was in line with narrow procedural requirements,
and notably, Fidesz pointed to other European countries that had similar substantive laws on the
books. For example, Fidesz changed standing requirements to institute aGerman-style complaints
jurisdiction, effectively denyingNGOs and opposition the ability to challenge the constitutionality
ofmajor institutional reforms that further facilitated the centralizationof power (Scheppele 2013a).
The difference, according to Scheppele, is that these laws, which are innocuous on their own,
work together to make it virtually impossible for opposition parties to unseat Fidesz. Scheppele’s
(2013a, p. 5) deﬁnition of a Frankenstate—“an abusive formof rule, created by combining perfectly
reasonable democratic institutions inmonstrousways”—will nodoubt have a familiar ring for those
who study courts in authoritarian regimes. Indeed, the parallels with Rajah’s (2012) account of
authoritarian rule of law in Singapore are striking.
Even in so-called consolidated democracies, the democratic/authoritarian dichotomy is in-
creasingly blurred. Consider the rapid, global expansion of emergency powers (Hufnagel &Roach
2012; Lazar 2009; Ramraj 2008; Scheppele 2004b,c). Or, in theUnited States speciﬁcally, consider
the widespread and covert domestic surveillance programs, detention of citizens without trial, aux-
iliary courts that operate with little transparency or oversight, and even targeted assassination of
citizens with only a veneer of legality. More than just a boutique niche, research on law and courts
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in authoritarian regimes offers a rich literature to draw upon for understanding the ways that law
and legal institutions can be subverted and reconﬁgured to undermine rights, all under the guise
of rule of law.
Yet one observes that there is very little cross-fertilization. For example, studies of the emer-
gency features in Western democracies in the wake of 9/11 make little use of the now substantial
body of research on states of emergency in authoritarian states. A recent exception is David
Landau’s (2013) work “Abusive Constitutionalism,” which explicitly reaches across regime type
to show similar patterns of legal and constitutional manipulation that undermine democratic in-
stitutions and entrench the power of incumbents. Similarly, David Law’s (2010) “How to Rig
the Federal Courts” shows how power can be entrenched through speciﬁc institutional rules that
might otherwise be understood as merely advancing judicial independence. Law does not predict
an imminent takeover of the US federal courts, but he nonetheless alerts us to “the perils of tak-
ing institutional design for granted” (p. 834). And in doing so, he suggests that research on law
and courts in authoritarian regimes “deserves attention for the insights that it contains into the
biases and vulnerabilities concealed within the structure of our own judicial institutions” (p. 835).
Let us not regard this new body of literature as merely an exotic niche within the comparative
judicial politics literature. The cautionary lessons for beleaguered democracies are too important
to ignore.
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